The Balkan Report

Truth Matters.

18 years since the burning of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, organized by Marko Đurić, Petar Petković and Miša Vacić

The burning of the U.S. Embassy remains a dark stain on Serbia’s international relations

Eighteen years ago, Belgrade set an embassy on fire and, with it, burned the illusion that Serbia had definitively moved beyond the politics of the street and the mob. The burning of the United States Embassy was not merely an act of vandalism, it was a political act. It was a message to the West, allowed and fueled by an elite that chose to play with nationalism in order to survive in power.

Four days after Kosova declared independence as a republic, the regime led by Vojislav Koštunica mobilized the crowd under the slogan “Kosovo is Serbia.” The U.S. Embassy was engulfed in flames, one person lost his life, and Serbia appeared before the world as a state that either could not, or would not, control the extremism it had itself incited.

But the story does not end with the fire. It begins there, because the people who helped organize that protest are today at the top of the Serbian state. Marko Đurić, Petar Petković, and Miša Vacić did not disappear into the margins of history. They were promoted, elevated, and turned into official faces of diplomacy, dialogue, and “stability.”

The Koštunica regime allowed the radicalization of the street, the regime of Aleksandar Vučić institutionalized it. There was no cleansing of the political elite. There was no moral distancing from February 21, 2008. On the contrary, there was integration of the protagonists into the highest structures of power.

Marko Đurić, linked to the organization of the protests at the time, was later appointed Serbia’s ambassador to Washington DC, serving from 2020 to 2024. The very country whose embassy had been burned in Belgrade became the destination of his diplomatic career. This appointment was not a symbol of remorse, but a symbol of a system that does not punish, it rewards loyalty.

Today, as foreign minister, Đurić speaks of partnership and stability. Yet his political career is tied to a moment when Serbia chose open confrontation with the West. He is not merely an official, but a symbol of a confrontational policy that produces crises in order to consolidate power in Belgrade.

Petar Petković followed the same trajectory. From Koštunica’s cabinet in 2008 to head of the so-called Office for Kosova and chief negotiator in Brussels. He presents himself as a technical manager of dialogue, yet his public communication often relies on mobilizing rhetoric that sustains a narrative of encirclement and victimhood. Dialogue outward, tension inward. That is the formula.

Meanwhile, Miša Vacić represents the most stripped-down version of this political culture. As founder of the ultranationalist movement “Naši 1389,” he has openly declared in interviews with Kremlin-linked media, including RT, that Serbia should follow Russia’s model in Crimea in order to “take back” Kosovo. This is not isolated rhetoric, it is part of a narrative that circulates freely in Serbia’s public sphere, often without political consequences.

This is precisely where the continuity between Koštunica and Vučić becomes clear. The former allowed the street to speak through fire, the latter learned to use that energy as a political reserve. Vučić understood that uncontrolled nationalism risks international isolation, but controlled nationalism is a powerful instrument for consolidating internal power.

The burning of the U.S. Embassy remains a dark stain on Serbia’s international relations. Yet there was no clear political accountability for the climate that made that act possible. The elite that inspired or tolerated the mobilization of that day was not marginalized, it was recycled.

That recycling is the essence of the current regime. Under Vučić, loyalty is the primary currency. Those who demonstrate readiness to mobilize in moments of crisis are rewarded with positions. Those who maintain a hard narrative on Kosova, yet know how to speak differently in Brussels and Washington DC, become part of the diplomatic apparatus.

That is why February 21, 2008 is not just a date. It is an unfinished moral test. It was the moment when Serbia could have chosen state responsibility and instead chose symbolic confrontation. The fact that the organizers of that day now stand at the pinnacle of power shows that the system has never undertaken deep reflection.

The embassy fire was extinguished. But the political culture that allowed that fire continues to generate tensions, managed crises, and a reality in which the past has never been seriously confronted. Serbia today may speak of stability and integration, yet the shadow of February 21 still looms over the structures that govern it. /The Balkan Report/


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