An open dictatorship of justice in Serbia

With the entry into force of the so-called Mrdić Laws, Serbia is entering a phase in which the work of the prosecution will be effectively paralyzed

After consolidating control over the police and security services, the authorities have now moved decisively to subjugate the judiciary, completing a cycle of institutional capture. Amendments to several key laws are designed to establish full party control over parts of the prosecutorial system, making an effective fight against organized crime and corruption practically impossible. The central target of these changes is the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime (TOK), an institution that has increasingly met cases involving individuals close to the ruling structures.

The mechanism is simple and highly effective. By returning second prosecutors from TOK to their local offices, the institution is stripped of both capacity and continuity. In parallel, the Higher Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade is granted expanded jurisdiction and additional departments, concentrating power in an institution led by figures closely aligned with the authorities. The result is a hollowed-out TOK, formally existing but operationally neutralized.

As indictments and investigations increasingly touched members of the ruling elite and their networks, the authorities opted for a solution that undermines the rule of law itself: rewriting the law to eliminate institutional risk. This approach replaces accountability with legal engineering and signals a deliberate abandonment of prosecutorial independence.

The official justification for these changes is framed as a return to constitutional order and state control. In practice, it represents a decisive shift toward party domination of the judiciary. The absence of public debate and any serious assessment of constitutional compatibility underscore the authoritarian nature of the process. Such moves establish a dangerous precedent and openly contradict the standards Serbia has formally committed to in its EU accession path.

European institutions have already characterized these changes as a serious regression, warning that they fundamentally undermine judicial independence and jeopardize Serbia’s prospects for EU membership. For some European policymakers, this moment marks a red line, beyond which continued accession negotiations lose credibility.

The depth of institutional decay is further illustrated by public statements from the highest judicial figures suggesting that judges who openly oppose the current government should be dismissed. This logic openly rejects the principle of judicial independence and replaces it with political loyalty as the primary criterion for remaining in office. Predictably, such statements have triggered strong reactions within the legal community, further exposing the internal collapse of professional norms.

At the same time, high-profile criminal cases involving large-scale drug seizures and individuals linked to the ruling party reinforce public perceptions that the systematic dismantling of prosecutorial autonomy is directly connected to the need for political protection. The sequencing events have made it increasingly difficult to separate legal reforms from the imperative of shielding power networks from scrutiny.

Fear within society is also diminishing, and with it the regime’s need to preserve even the appearance of democratic governance. The current trajectory suggests a transition from managed democracy to an openly authoritarian model, where legal norms are subordinated to political will. In this environment, the law no longer serves as a constraint on power but as an instrument of it.

The concentration of power and total institutional control also strips elections of their substantive meaning. Court decisions related to electoral irregularities are ignored, internal judicial elections are annulled, and the response of the Constitutional Court has become largely predictable. When judicial remedies fail, enforcement is ensured through a loyal police apparatus tasked with protecting illegality and political arbitrariness.

Under these conditions, effective legal protection ceases to exist. Political disputes no longer have an institutional outlet, and the very idea of constitutional review is rendered meaningless when the guardians of the constitution openly reject the supremacy of law.

Elections in Serbia have long since lost their democratic function. What once relied on manipulation now increasingly depends on overt coercion, backed by state power and security structures prepared to defend the outcome. The only remaining uncertainty lies in the level of societal resistance and the willingness of citizens to respond collectively when electoral theft becomes impossible to conceal.

The European Union has acknowledged that these developments represent a major blow to Serbia’s European integration. Belgrade’s response, however, has been marked by cynicism and denial, insisting that no regression has occurred while offering no evidence of progress. The repeated invocation of a vague European path has become an empty formula, detached from any genuine reform agenda.

Even the creation of new coordination bodies for European integration appears primarily designed to buy time rather than deliver change. By framing judicial reforms as subjects for future dialogue and compromise, the authorities signal that institutional capture is not a deviation but a negotiating position.

The prevailing assumption in Belgrade seems to be that the EU is too distracted by larger crises to impose serious consequences. Whether this calculation proves correct will shape not only Serbia’s political future but also the credibility of the European project in the Western Balkans. /Deutsche Welle/