Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Naypyidaw are developing messaging apps as tools to control their citizens

It is not the Kremlin’s first attempt to push citizens toward censored, state-controlled IT services, and Moscow’s authoritarian peers in Beijing, Tehran, and even Naypyidaw have made similar attempts – with varying results

In August 2021, Iranian marketing specialist and social media expert Houman Gorbanian discovered that a page using his name had appeared without his consent on the state-controlled social network Rubika. The name and photo were real, and so were the posts. The service was automatically scanning Gorbanian’s personal Instagram account, copying updates, and populating a fake profile.

After Gorbanian posted an angry message on Twitter/X, many other Iranians, from ordinary users to well-known football players and artists, discovered similar fake pages on Rubika. Some of those pages even carried blue verification checkmarks.

Four years before Russia unveiled MAX, Iran had already begun promoting a state messenger intended to replace Western platforms. In late July 2021, Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, passed the User Protection in Cyberspace Law, which sharply restricted internet access and transferred control over online traffic to security agencies. The law soon led to the blocking of WhatsApp, Instagram, and other popular services. At the same time, authorities launched an aggressive promotional campaign for Rubika, with fake celebrity pages forming part of that effort.

Gorbanian wrote at the time that the goal was to use fake accounts to create the impression of public trust and to present the platform as a success. He argued that the effort only exposed the authorities’ lack of understanding and repeatedly embarrassed them.

Despite widespread blocking of familiar messengers and social networks, Iran’s censorship has not achieved total dominance. On paper, Rubika appears successful, reporting 44 million monthly users, nearly half the country’s population. Daily usage, however, is far lower, between 12 and 15 million users, less than WhatsApp and Telegram, according to Iranian opposition analyst Amir Chahaki.

Chahaki explained that people use Rubika primarily when it involves the state. Companies seeking to participate in government tenders must do so through the app. Over the past two or three years, these mandatory uses have expanded. Rubika now plays a role similar to a military service certificate. Without it, many basic administrative processes become impossible. In everyday life, however, most people continue using blocked services like WhatsApp and Telegram through VPNs.

Rubika is designed as a super app. It integrates payments, government services, a marketplace, a social network, a video platform, a ride-hailing substitute, and a messenger. Users can also communicate with people on three other regime-controlled services: Bale, Soroush, and Eitaa.

All these Iranian state messaging apps monitor users. The Open Technology Fund security lab tested Eitaa, Rubika, and Bale and found that none of them use end-to-end encryption. The apps track when users click external links, and Rubika allows direct monitoring of private chats and interception of sensitive data.

In its planned features and level of state support, Rubika closely resembles Russia’s MAX. Publicly, however, the Russian messenger is rarely compared to Rubika and is instead almost always likened to China’s WeChat.

WeChat is also a state-controlled super app. It enables surveillance, real-time censorship, shadow banning, and other tools used to suppress free expression. Despite this, it has nearly 1.4 billion active users and is commercially successful. The app sits at the center of Tencent’s ecosystem and generates significant revenue through advertising, mini-apps, and payments.

According to Sarkis Darbinyan, a lawyer and co-founder of the digital rights group Roskomsvoboda, the differences between China’s super app and Russia’s version are substantial. The key distinction is historical. In China, censorship has existed for as long as the internet itself, and new technologies developed under state control from the beginning.

Notably, WeChat does not work in Russia, nor do several other Chinese services. In late 2025, Chinese tourists complained that SMS activation codes were not reaching Chinese SIM cards while roaming in Russia. As a result, China’s main messaging app also became a casualty of Kremlin blocking measures.

Other governments have tried to push users away from familiar platforms toward so-called sovereign alternatives. According to Mikhail Klimarev, executive director of the Internet Protection Society, Russia’s current efforts most closely resemble Myanmar’s experience.

After a military coup in 2021 brought a junta to power, Myanmar quickly banned Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram. The state then developed its own government-controlled social network called Myspace Myanmar, which has no connection to the early-2000s platform.

The app launched on April 27, 2024, but opponents of the junta quickly organized a boycott. By June, the app was removed from Google Play. During its six-week lifespan, it was downloaded just over 1,000 times and never claimed more than 20,000 active users in a country of nearly 56 million people.

Russia has made several attempts to build a sovereign messenger. Yandex and Sber both tried, but the most prominent effort was TamTam. It was launched in 2016 as OK Messages, an internal messenger for the Odnoklassniki social network.

TamTam gained wider attention in 2018 when it was promoted as an alternative to Telegram during Roskomnadzor’s attempts to block Pavel Durov’s app. By then, TamTam allowed channels like Telegram’s and had become a standalone product. That same year, copies of popular Telegram channels appeared on TamTam without their authors’ consent.

In 2020, the Ministry of Digital Development added TamTam to the registry of socially significant internet resources meant to remain accessible even if Russia were disconnected from the global internet. Despite this support, TamTam never achieved mass adoption. It surpassed 10 million downloads only in 2023 and reportedly had about 1 million monthly users.

Instead, TamTam became a platform for bot developers and fraud specialists. In 2019, it also unexpectedly attracted supporters of the Islamic State, with English-language extremist chats flourishing on the platform.

VK Group later attempted another sovereign messenger by relaunching ICQ under the ICQ New brand. The app was added to the socially significant list, used by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, and preinstalled on all smartphones sold in Russia. Nonetheless, ICQ officially shut down on June 26, 2024.

A month later, media reports emerged about a new national messenger that would become MAX. VK developed it based on TamTam, and after its release, researchers found clear traces of TamTam and OK Messages in its codebase. Klimarev noted that VK products largely share the same underlying code.

What distinguishes MAX is the social context of its rollout. It is being promoted amid wartime censorship and repression, including a special law on the national messenger. Additional regulations continue to be followed. Recent amendments to the Housing Code require property management companies to communicate with residents exclusively through MAX, alongside ongoing blocking of competing messengers.

New laws continue to push users toward MAX. In December alone, two measures were approved: one enabling age verification for alcohol and tobacco purchases through MAX, and another introducing digital student IDs and grade books accessible via Gosuslugi and MAX. As a result, students in Novorossiysk have reportedly been threatened with exclusion from exams for refusing to install the app.

An extensive advertising campaign portrays MAX as fast and secure, though its speed is partly achieved by throttling competitors. While the app loads video quickly, fraud protection is another matter. MAX has no chat encryption at all, creating serious security risks.

According to Roskomsvoboda, scammers are already purchasing verified MAX accounts for targeted attacks. A black market has emerged, confirmed by a bot-farm operator who said accounts sell for two to three dollars each and are often purchased in batches of hundreds.

Experts found no unusual behavior in MAX during testing. While the app requests access to the camera, location, and contacts, users can deny these permissions. The larger concern is structural. As a VK product, MAX is subject to laws requiring data storage on servers accessible to the FSB, where information can be analyzed using artificial intelligence.

Klimarev argued that MAX itself does not spy on other apps. The real danger lies in enforcement patterns. Most Russian cases related to online speech originate from VK platforms, creating a climate of fear that deters expression even without constant arrests.

Even officials appear reluctant to use MAX. In September, a Moscow police officer contacted the article’s author via WhatsApp and said he had no plans to switch to MAX, preferring familiar tools accessed through a VPN.

For now, resistance continues, but Darbinyan believes habits will change. A new generation may grow up knowing no alternative. A preinstalled app feels natural. If enforcement continues, MAX could reach half the population, particularly younger users unwilling to invest in VPNs.

Iran’s experience shows that even aggressive censorship does not guarantee compliance. Rubika remains widely distrusted. Claiming to use it exclusively often raises suspicion of ties to security services. Even police and military personnel avoid personal communication on the app.

Iran has criminalized VPN use, yet Instagram remains the country’s most popular social network. Members of the ruling elite also bypass restrictions, including figures accused of profiting from VPN sales.

Chinese users also circumvent controls at scale. Roughly 100 million Chinese accounts reportedly exist on Twitter/X, despite decades of internet isolation. Those who comply, however, contribute to the expansion of censorship.

In Russia, each new MAX download brings broader blocking closer. According to Klimarev, authorities are targeting user numbers. Once MAX reaches its quota, WhatsApp and Telegram may be blocked. A State Duma lawmaker later confirmed that Telegram would remain accessible only until channels migrate to MAX.

Klimarev placed responsibility not only on governments but also on Apple and Google for allowing MAX in their app stores, including outside Russia. VK’s leadership and major shareholders are under U.S. sanctions, yet its apps remain available. In his view, removing MAX from app stores would significantly slow censorship efforts.

There are precedents. Myspace Myanmar was blocked shortly after launch, and Rubika and other Iranian state messengers were removed from Google Play in 2022. /The Insider/