Russian propaganda in North Macedonia

Moscow systematically uses information manipulation as a tool of foreign policy, in North Macedonia, Russian propaganda relies on a set of recurring narratives designed to exploit political uncertainty and social frustration

The influence of Russian propaganda in the Western Balkans is neither new nor unfamiliar. For years, European institutions and civil society organizations have warned about Moscow’s destabilizing role in the region, particularly in countries aspiring to join the European Union. North Macedonia, a NATO member since 2020 and an EU candidate country, is no exception, much like other Western Balkan states, with Serbia often at the forefront.

Recent political developments in Skopje have intensified concerns about the country’s European integration path. The current government and Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski have shown little willingness to accelerate key reforms, especially constitutional amendments, despite promises made during the election campaign. The pledge that these changes would be adopted within six months of taking office has not been fulfilled.

In late January, the prime minister made it clear that constitutional changes would not take place during his mandate unless specific conditions were met. These conditions included addressing the status of the Macedonian community in Bulgaria and receiving guarantees against bilateral vetoes, political humiliation, or what he described as subjective discrimination.

The delay in constitutional amendments reflects domestic political dynamics more than direct Russian influence. However, the geopolitical consequences are unavoidable. Any postponement of constitutional changes delays the country’s EU accession process, and the more distant the EU perspective becomes, the more space opens up for third-party actors, including Russia. In this sense, Russian influence is not necessarily the cause of the blockage, but rather its beneficiary.

A key factor often overlooked in analyses of foreign influence is that propaganda cannot function without receptive ground. No external power can impose influence unless parts of society or local elites are willing to accept it. Influence is not a military occupation, but a voluntary relationship between those who offer a narrative and those who embrace it.

In the Western Balkans, accumulated frustration with lengthy and conditional integration processes has created space for alternative discourses. This is where the Russian narrative finds traction.

Moscow has consistently used information manipulation as a foreign policy instrument. Known as information warfare or foreign information manipulation and interference, this approach goes beyond traditional diplomacy by targeting emotions, identity, and social insecurities. Many experts describe it as part of a broader hybrid warfare strategy, where information becomes a tool of political and social influence.

In North Macedonia, Russian propaganda is built around several recurring themes. Russia is portrayed as a defender of traditional values, Orthodox identity, and pan-Slavism, while the West is depicted as a liberal force that imposes conditions and undermines national identity. Issues such as the country’s name change, demands for constitutional amendments, and the protection of minority rights are framed as humiliations imposed by the European Union.

Religious and traditional sentiments play a central role in this influence strategy. Church structures and so-called civic initiatives are often used as intermediary channels to promote narratives that depict the West as morally degenerate.

Pro-Russian narratives are not confined to the media sphere; they also resonate in domestic politics. Parties such as Levica openly express anti-NATO and anti-EU positions, while political movements like United Macedonia, led by Janko Baćev, advocate closer ties with Russia and reject Euro-Atlantic integration.

Within the executive branch itself, there are figures known for their close connections to Moscow. Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Stoiljković, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbs, has participated in Russian security forums and promoted bilateral cooperation with Russia.

These concerns were also reflected in the European Parliament’s report of June 26, 2025. The rapporteur, Thomas Waitz, warned about the influence of the so-called Serbian World concept, supported by government representatives and closely linked to Russian and Chinese interests in the region.

Research shows that Russian propaganda spreads primarily through media outlets that rebroadcast content from Sputnik Serbia, RT Serbia, and Serbian tabloids, which are then adapted for the Macedonian audience. Social media platforms act as amplifiers for these narratives.

Facebook, X, and Telegram in particular are used by the Russian Embassy in Skopje and reinforced by bot networks to disseminate disinformation, especially regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the promotion of so-called traditional values.

The goal is not full domination of public discourse, but rather the fragmentation of the information space, the creation of confusion, and the erosion of trust in democratic institutions.

Although Russian influence in North Macedonia is not currently dominant, it represents a real risk. Propaganda creates illusions, fuels ethnic and religious polarization, undermines institutional trust, and slows down the country’s European integration.

Confronting this phenomenon requires professional journalism, institutional transparency, media literacy, and legal regulation of media ownership and financing. Fighting disinformation is not censorship; it is the protection of the public sphere from the abuse of freedom of expression.

Ultimately, the choice is both political and societal: Europe as a project of reforms and standards, or the illusion of an alternative that offers neither development nor security. /Deutsche Welle/