Russia’s Balkan Playbook: Paramilitary camps and diplomatic shadows through Serbia and Montenegro

Belgrade relies on Moscow because of its opposition to Kosova’s independence, as well as gas dependence, and it frequently invokes traditionally friendly relations

Paramilitary camps, the spread of racial and religious hatred, espionage across Europe, surveillance of Russian opposition activists, and safe haven for expelled Russian diplomats. These are some of the affairs linking Russia to Serbia.

The authorities in Serbia, who maintain friendly ties with the Kremlin, have not clarified or brought any of these cases to a conclusion.

Belgrade relies on Moscow because of its opposition to Kosova’s independence, as well as gas dependence, and it frequently invokes traditionally friendly relations.

Serbia is one of the few European countries that has not imposed sanctions on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. Official contacts have not been severed even four years into the war, despite calls from the European Union and Washington DC for Belgrade to distance itself from Moscow. The presence of Russian services in Serbia is a signal both to the West and to domestic actors, showing that Russia still has access and influence in Serbia.

The case of a Russian paramilitary camp discovered along the Drina River in western Serbia in September 2025 remains under investigation.

Suspects have been questioned, witnesses examined, and expert analyses are ongoing. The office is investigating Lazar Popović from Belgrade and Sava Stevanović from Loznica. Popović’s detention was replaced with bail on February 6, while Stevanović was released on October 17 after witnesses were questioned.

They are suspected of organizing combat-tactical training at a hospitality complex called Sunčana Reka, allegedly aimed at providing physical resistance to Moldovan police in case of unrest during election day on September 28, 2025. Both are linked to pro-Russian Minister without portfolio in the Serbian government Nenad Popović.

President Aleksandar Vučić later stated that three Russian nationals had been present at the camp. He did not, however, connect Russian intelligence services to the site. Russia has not been officially mentioned in statements by Serbian police or prosecutors.

Serbia’s Interior Ministry said between 150 and 170 Moldovan and Romanian nationals underwent training there. In Moldova, more than 70 people were detained as part of a parallel investigation, most suspected of having been trained in Serbia. They were accused of preparing mass unrest and destabilization ahead of parliamentary elections on September 28, in which the pro-European ruling party defeated a pro-Russian coalition.

Meanwhile, a Moldovan court convicted three individuals over organizing similar training sessions in 2024 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina also opened a case related to those trainings.

Moldovan officials have repeatedly claimed that Russia organized training in Western Balkan countries to incite unrest. Ahead of the 2024 presidential election and EU membership referendum in Chișinău, authorities alleged that training sessions were led by individuals linked to Russian mercenary groups such as Ferma and Wagner.

Another case under investigation involves 11 Serbian nationals arrested on suspicion of carrying out a series of racist actions in Paris and Berlin. According to Serbian police, the actions targeted Jewish and Muslim religious communities in an attempt to further inflame social tensions. They were arrested in late September 2025 in Smederevo, about 60 kilometers south of Belgrade.

According to a summary of the report, the Kremlin sought to increase tensions between Jewish and Muslim communities in France in order to sow division and weaken national cohesion.

French investigative media reported that a Serbian national, Aleksandar Savić, was a key figure in both incidents, with ties to Russia detected by French intelligence services.

In November 2019, a video surfaced online allegedly showing a Russian intelligence officer handing money to a retired member of the Serbian Army. Serbian officials said the footage was recorded on December 24, 2018.

The authenticity of the video was confirmed by Relja Željski, head of analytics at Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA), who said it featured Russian intelligence officer Georgiy Kleban.

Although President Vučić convened a session of the National Security Council, after meeting with Russian Ambassador Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko he declared the affair closed.

In mid-November 2025, Radomir Kurtić, a representative of Serbia’s state arms trade company Yugoimport SDPR in Moscow, was found dead in the Russian capital.

Pro-government Serbian media reported that security services had informed the president of the suspicious death. Vučić said official Belgrade expected answers from Russian authorities and that forensic reports had not been sent.

Russian intelligence accused Belgrade in May 2025 of trying to stab Russia in the back by supplying ammunition to Ukraine through intermediaries, including some NATO members. In a statement by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Yugoimport SDPR was listed among Serbian state companies allegedly involved. A month later, Serbia introduced a moratorium on all exports of domestically produced arms and military equipment.

During mass anti-government protests and university blockades following the deaths of 16 people at the Novi Sad railway station, Serbian authorities requested that Russian investigators conduct an independent inquiry into whether a sonic weapon was used at a peaceful protest on March 15, 2025.

In an April 2025 report, Russia’s Federal Security Service concluded that no such device had been used. The report stated that acoustic devices of the LRAD type, owned by Serbian police, were not deployed. It also noted that the emitter’s effects were tested on dogs due to their high sensitivity to acoustic effects.

Possible intentions include preserving the political regime in Serbia, supporting a government that maintains close ties and avoids sanctions on Russia, and increasing Russian influence in the region. Russian services in moments of crisis help legitimize the narrative of a so-called “colored revolution”, shifting focus away from corruption, public dissatisfaction, and the suppression of student protests.

Several domestic and international non-governmental organizations investigating the March 15 protest, including Earshot, presented evidence suggesting that a sonic weapon was most likely used. The United Nations committee and the European Union called on Serbian authorities to conduct a swift, transparent, and credible investigation.

At least three Russian diplomats expelled from European Union countries for espionage were later accredited in Serbia.

Russia expanded its diplomatic presence in Serbia after the wave of expulsions from the EU in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine. In March 2023, Serbia’s Foreign Ministry listed 62 accredited diplomats, compared with 54 a year earlier.

In December 2021, Russian opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza accused Aleksandar Vulin, then Serbia’s police Minister, of delivering recordings of a meeting of Russian opposition figures in Belgrade to Moscow. Vulin denied the claim and announced a lawsuit, though it is unclear whether proceedings were initiated.

Two years later, Kara-Murza was sentenced in Russia to 25 years in prison for treason and spreading false information. He was released in summer 2024 in a prisoner exchange between Russia and Western countries. Vulin has been under US sanctions since July 2023 over alleged corruption, involvement in drug trafficking, and ties to Russia.

In neighboring Montenegro, the state coup case that shook the country a decade ago reached a judicial conclusion on February 20.

The Court of Appeals of Montenegro confirmed an acquittal in the retrial of those accused of attempting terrorism on parliamentary election day in October 2016, stating that it was not proven the defendants committed the offenses charged.

Among those acquitted were pro-Serbian politicians Milan Knežević and Andrija Mandić, along with other defendants. Thirteen people from Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro were indicted. Russian nationals Eduard Shishmakov and Vladimir Popov had been accused of organizing and financing the coup attempt.

Eight Serbian citizens were also indicted, including retired Serbian Gendarmerie general Bratislav Dikić. Two defendants were unavailable, and Serbia refused extradition.

The Higher Court initially sentenced the defendants to prison terms, but the Court of Appeals overturned the ruling and ordered a retrial. In the new trial, the Higher Court acquitted them. The Special Prosecutor’s Office appealed, but the Court of Appeals rejected the complaint on February 20.

Today, Andrija Mandić serves as Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament, while Milan Knežević is a member of parliament. Their coalition supported the current government of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić after the 2023 elections and had previously participated in the 2020 vote that ended nearly three decades of rule by the Democratic Party of Socialists led by former President Milo Đukanović.