September 24 in Banjska: Two years since Serbia’s aggression against Kosova’s sovereignty and the West’s silence

The Banjska Attack was carefully prepared and bore the clear hallmarks of a military operation

On September 24, 2023, Kosova faced one of the most serious attacks on its sovereignty since the end of the war. That day marked the moment when a heavily armed Serbian paramilitary group, organized and supported by the Serbian state, entered the village of Banjska in Zveçan, killing Kosova Police Sergeant Afrim Bunjaku, now remembered as a hero. This was not a random incident, but a carefully planned operation, logistically and politically backed by Belgrade, aimed at creating a controlled zone in northern Kosova. Two years after this act of aggression, its traces remain fresh, while Serbia’s responsibility is undeniable.

The Banjska attack was carefully prepared and bore the clear hallmarks of a military operation. The terrorist group possessed sophisticated weapons, armored vehicles, secure communication equipment, and a structured logistics chain that went far beyond any possibility of spontaneous organization. Investigations and published evidence showed that the terrorists had a secure channel to infiltrate from Serbia into Kosova, that they had prepared maps and action plans, and that the Banjska Monastery was used as a shelter and tactical stronghold. At the same time, the Serbian army was put on alert, ready to intervene if the operation escalated.

The key figure in this attack turned out to be Milan Radoičić, then Vice-President of Serb List, one of Belgrade’s closest allies in the norther of Kosova. He was identified as the direct leader of the group and later publicly admitted that he had organized the terrorist action. Yet, despite the evidence, Radoičić was never punished. On the contrary, he continues to be protected by the Serbian state and personally by President Aleksandar Vučić, proving the organic link between Serbia’s official policy and the criminal and paramilitary structures used as instruments of state strategy. His complete freedom, uninterrupted influence on the ground, and open support for Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party are testimony that Serbia not only refuses to distance itself from crime but actively uses it as part of its national policy.

The ultimate goal of the attack was clear: the creation of a Belgrade-controlled zone in northern Kosova. This would be a step toward the de facto annexation of that territory, mirroring Russia’s models in Georgia and Ukraine. Serbia, closely aligned with Russia, follows the same strategy of “frozen zones” to weaken Kosova’s statehood and impose political realities on the ground. In this scenario, Kosova is viewed as a space to be constantly destabilized to prevent its consolidation. This strategy failed thanks to the swift and professional response of the Kosova Police, the Kosova Intelligence Agency, and the firm stance of state institutions.

One often overlooked but crucial element for the Serbian state was the role of the Orthodox Church. The Banjska Monastery was turned into a shelter for the terrorist group. This fact is not isolated. History shows that the Serbian Orthodox Church has often been mobilized in the service of political and nationalist projects, feeding the narrative of “protecting Serbs” and legitimizing Belgrade’s state strategies through the language of religion. The use of the monastery as a base for an armed operation is evidence of its structural involvement, not merely a sporadic abuse. This links the Serbian Church with politics and violence.

At the international level, the Banjska attack exposed the gap between facts and reaction. Even though it became clear that Serbia had organized aggression against a sovereign state, the response of Western countries remained limited to general statements. Calls for restraint and dialogue did not match the gravity of the act. The September 24 aggression was a flagrant violation of international law, a direct challenge to the principles of collective security, and it deserved clear sanctions. Yet, no punitive measures were taken against Serbia. On the contrary, Belgrade continued to be treated as an indispensable partner in dialogue, creating a perception of impunity. This misguided approach weakened the West’s credibility in the region and encouraged Serbia to persist with destabilizing policies.

Two years after the event, the balance is clear. Kosova has strengthened security measures in the north and increased institutional presence to prevent the repetition of similar scenarios. Serbia, meanwhile, has intensified its nationalist rhetoric and taken no steps to distance itself from organized crime. Radoičić remains free, while Serb List continues to serve as Belgrade’s main destabilizing instrument in Kosova. The Serbian Orthodox Church continues to play a political role, often reinforcing Vučić’s narrative. International institutions remain passive, limiting themselves to calls for dialogue without imposing concrete measures against the aggressor. Kosova has gained ground diplomatically by presenting evidence of Serbia’s involvement, but practical support from its allies has been limited.

A significant development is that Kosova’s judiciary has now issued an official indictment for this terrorist act, classifying the attack as an organized aggression against the state’s constitutional order and security. This legal step adds further weight to the evidence directly linking Belgrade to the operation and opens the path to holding the perpetrators accountable under the law.

From the perspective of international law, the Banjska aggression cannot be seen as an isolated incident but represents a dangerous precedent. Allowing Serbia to carry out such an act without consequences not only undermines the international order but also encourages other actors, such as Russia, to pursue the same strategy. Punishing Serbia is not only in Kosova’s national interest but is also a necessity for regional stability and the credibility of the West itself. Concrete measures such as economic sanctions, halting Serbia’s EU integration process, imposing individual sanctions on the Serbian political leadership, and blacklisting figures like Radoičić are steps that must be taken to ensure that such events do not recur.

The truth is clearer than ever. The attack was a state-organized terrorist act, backed by politics, intelligence, the military, and the Serbian Orthodox Church. It was pure aggression against Kosova and a challenge to the international order. Kosova seeks nothing more than what international law guarantees: respect for its sovereignty and security. Punishing Serbia for the September 24 aggression is not just a fair demand by Kosova but a necessity for peace and stability in the Balkans. If Serbia faces no consequences, the region will remain hostage to Belgrade’s hegemonic ambitions and Russia’s interference, which sees the Balkans as fertile ground to undermine the Euro-Atlantic order.