Serbia again fails to align with four EU decisions related to sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia all aligned with the EU decisions

The European External Action Service (EEAS) announced that Serbia had once again failed to align with four European Union decisions related to sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The decisions include the extension of restrictive measures against Russia over its war in Ukraine until July 31, 2026, the addition of two individuals to the sanctions list, and new sanctions targeting 41 vessels, oil tankers belonging to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” used to circumvent existing measures.

Serbia also declined to align with the EU’s updated sanctions framework on Belarus, which introduces an expanded criterion for listing individuals and entities responsible for undermining democracy, the rule of law, stability, or security, not only within the EU but also in third countries. The scope of this measure directly addresses the hybrid and destabilizing practices that Belgrade routinely condemns in rhetoric, while avoiding them in policy.

The contrast with the region is stark. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia all aligned with the EU decisions, as did Ukraine. Even non-EU countries such as Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein followed suit. Serbia, meanwhile, the country that presents itself as the frontrunner in EU accession, once again chose non-alignment.

This was not a technical omission or a moment of hesitation. It reflects a consistent political strategy. Serbia continues to simulate commitment to European integration while avoiding any move that would require a clear and irreversible distancing from Moscow. The refusal to sanction Russia, even symbolically, is not neutrality. It is a calculated choice.

What this reveals is a dual-track policy. Toward Brussels, Serbia maintains the language of reforms, dialogue, and accession. When alignment carries real political or economic cost, it steps aside. EU candidacy thus functions less as a roadmap and more as a narrative tool, useful for managing expectations abroad and legitimizing power at home.

Placed alongside President Aleksandar Vučić’s domestic rhetoric about foreign plots, “color revolutions,” and external enemies, Serbia’s foreign-policy behavior completes the picture. Internationally, Belgrade avoids confronting Russia. Domestically, Russia serves as an unspoken reference point, a counterweight that allows the president to perform the role of a besieged protector of sovereignty.

In that sense, Serbia’s repeated refusal to align with EU sanctions is not an anomaly. It is a structural feature of the current governing model: strategic ambiguity, transactional diplomacy, and the deliberate blurring of political loyalties. The state remains formally on a European path, while its leadership preserves room to maneuver by keeping Moscow close enough to matter.

The message to the European Union is increasingly difficult to ignore. Serbia seeks the benefits of the accession process without accepting its obligations. For now, that balancing act continues. The question is not whether Brussels understands it, but how long it is willing to tolerate it. /The Balkan Report/