The Russian Historical Society: The sacred alliance of the “Srpski Svet” and “Russkiy Mir” in carrying Kremlin’s ideology into the Balkans

From a regional security perspective, the “Srpski Svet” is part of a broader project coordinated with Moscow to perpetuate constant tension in the Balkans

In Serbia, a project that extends far beyond the usual boundaries of state politics into the realms of ideology, religion, and culture is steadily taking shape: the concept of the “Srpski Svet.” Aleksandar Vulin, one of the most controversial and loyal figures of Aleksandar Vučić’s regime and one of the loudest pro-Russian voices in Serbia, is at the center of this project. While the concept initially appears to be a defense of Serbian culture and identity, at its core, it aligns with the doctrine of the “Russkiy Mir,” a geopolitical model promoted by the Kremlin to expand Russian influence beyond its borders through language, religion, and shared history.

Vulin entered the spotlight during the founding of the Russian Historical Society in Belgrade. Although this association was publicly presented as an initiative to strengthen historical and cultural ties between Serbia and Russia, it is a well-calculated political project. At the ceremony, representatives from Serbian state institutions, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Moscow-based association linked to Vladimir Putin’s administration were present. The speeches emphasized “the need to preserve the shared historical memory of the brotherly Russian and Serbian peoples.”

Vulin’s words about a “peaceful struggle for the creation of the Srpski Svet” are deliberately contradictory. He is not referring to a military war, but to an ideological, cultural, and identity-based one, a soft offensive meant to normalize a project that, in practice, carries heavy political consequences. Vulin presents Russia as the eternal ally of the Serbian people, even as the guarantor of their survival. This emotional and historical connection between the two peoples is portrayed as “brotherly friendship,” but in reality it functions as a tool to justify Russian influence in Serbia’s internal politics and its relations with its neighbors. This is not mere rhetoric but a communication strategy that fuses Serbian national identity with Moscow’s ideological axis, creating the foundation for a shared political and spiritual narrative.

The Serbian Orthodox Church, through the public positions of its hierarchy, has provided the moral and symbolic blessings for this discourse. Patriarch Porfirije welcomed the initiative to create a “shared historical space” with Russia, framing it as part of a spiritual tradition that must be protected from “historical revisionism.” This indirectly grants religious legitimacy to the “Srpski Svet,” portraying it as a sacred mission rather than a political project. The Russian Orthodox Church has echoed the same language for years, nourishing the doctrine of “Russkiy Mir” and claiming that Russia has a moral duty to protect the “Slavic-Orthodox world” from Western influence. The ties between the two churches are deep, both spiritual and political. The Serbian Church sees itself as the defender of Serbdom in Kosova, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Russian Church sees itself as the guardian of Russian language and Orthodoxy in post-Soviet regions.

This is the essence of the fusion between religion and politics. The Serbian Patriarch’s and other church representatives’ speeches are not just religious messages, they are part of a coordinated narrative that portrays any criticism of the “Srpski Svet” as an attack on faith and national identity. In this way, politics become sanctified, and religion turns into a political instrument. Through this symbiosis, Serbia is in a favorable position to export its ideology while Russia uses it to maintain a strong influence in the Western Balkans, a region the Kremlin sees as a gateway to Europe.

Although the Serbian president often tries to distance himself from Vulin’s harsh rhetoric, he remains the main beneficiary of this strategy. Vučić plays on two fronts: on one hand, he presents himself as a moderate leader seeking European integration; on the other, he keeps close his most pro-Russian and nationalist figures to preserve his conservative power base. Vulin serves as the voice that Vučić cannot use himself, a political trial balloon for legitimizing the most extreme narratives. Through this model, Belgrade maintains a balance between the West and the East, while quietly building a narrative that positions Serbia as the leader of the “Srpski Svet” and the protector of Russian interests in the region.

For the Kremlin, this is a soft diplomatic victory. Without deploying troops or applying direct pressure, Moscow has managed to project its influence across the Balkans through figures like Vulin, the Church, and state-funded media. The “Srpski Svet” mirrors the “Russkiy Mir,” both of which are grounded in three pillars: history, faith, and a sense of threat from the West. This shared strategy exploits historical trauma, a sense of injustice, and the myth of victimhood to create an identity that resists Western influence. Consequently, Serbia becomes a cornerstone of Russia’s project to destabilize the region and block Euro-Atlantic integration.

Kosova remains the main target. For Belgrade and the ideologues of the “Srpski Svet,” it is the central symbol of Serbian history, faith, and identity. Any attempt to incorporate Kosova into this concept undermines its statehood, this is done through networks of the Serbian Orthodox Church that portray Kosova as the “cradle of Serbian civilization,” media that perpetuate narratives about “threats to Serbs in the north,” and parallel structures that keep the Serbian minority community under Belgrade’s control. The “Srpski Svet” is not an abstract concept, but rather a concrete strategy designed to weaken the sovereignty of Kosova’s institutions.

At the regional level, the project aims to create a cultural and political union of Serbs throughout the Balkans. Republika Srpska is considered an integral part of this vision, while Montenegro is described as a place where the Serbian spirit must be revived. The Orthodox Church serves as the connective tissue across these territories, building spiritual bridges that act as channels of political influence. The project is particularly dangerous because it doesn’t present itself as a state offensive, but rather as a cultural initiative based on “traditional values.” In reality, however, it is a hybrid offensive that combines propaganda, religious influence, and disinformation campaigns to shape public opinion across the region.

In Kosova, this manifests through ongoing tensions in the north, efforts to undermine institutional authority, and the spread of narratives that “Serbs are abandoned and under threat.” The goal is to sustain a sense of division, making every integration of the Serbian minority community into Kosova’s state system appear as betrayal of national identity. This creates a parallel reality in which Serbs in Kosova live within an information, symbolic, and emotional world manufactured by Belgrade. The “Srpski Svet” functions as an imagined space imposed upon the real state territories of neighboring countries.

At the level of public communication, the project is fueled by media networks tied to the Serbian government and platforms that promote Russian narratives in the Balkans. These networks reinforce the idea that Serbia is under Western pressure, Russia is its only reliable ally, and the “Srpski Svet” needs a leader to defend its legacy. This explains why Vulin often refers to Vučić as “the leader of all Serbs”, a phrase that, beyond its emotional appeal, serves a clear political purpose: to position the Serbian president as a central figure not only in Serbia, but also throughout the region where Serbs reside. It’s a vision of a “mini spiritual empire” in which loyalty to Belgrade supersedes loyalty to the countries in which Serb communities reside.

From a regional security perspective, the “Srpski Svet” is part of a broader project coordinated with Moscow to perpetuate constant tension in the Balkans. Russia uses this to gain leverage and prevent NATO and the EU from consolidating the region. Serbia benefits from its status as “everyone’s ally” and uses this to its advantage to prolong the status quo in Kosova and maintain influence in Bosnia and Montenegro. Any attempt at Western integration is perceived as a threat to this “world” because it endangers the spiritual and political ties that uphold it.

In conclusion, the “Srpski Svet” is a multidimensional project that is political in its goals, religious in its justification, cultural in its form, and geopolitical in its function. Its objective toward Kosova is clear: to maintain instability, prevent full integration of the Serbian minority, and preserve Belgrade’s control over the north. For the Balkans, the danger lies in the revival of nationalisms that do not value coexistence. /The Balkan Report/