Two years after the May 29 terrorist attack in the north of Kosova: Vučić’s criminal-political network, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Europe’s silence

Serbian hooligans and organized terrorist groups attacked NATO/KFOR troops

Two years ago, on May 29, 2023, the north of Kosova became the scene of one of the most severe and dangerous attacks on peace and security in the region. On that day, dozens of Serbian hooligans and organized terrorist groups, armed with iron bars, Molotov cocktails, and other violent tools, attacked NATO/KFOR troops in Zveçan and North Mitrovica, injuring dozens of Italian and Hungarian soldiers. This act of aggression was neither spontaneous nor local, it was part of a deliberate destabilization strategy sponsored by the Belgrade regime under the direction of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and executed on the ground by wanted terrorist Milan Radoičić.

Following the Local Elections held in April 2023 in the north municipalities, which were boycotted by local Serbs with direct support from Belgrade, the Kosovar authorities decided that the elected Albanian mayors in Zveçan, Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica should begin exercising their functions. This decision, legitimate under the constitutional and legal framework of the Republic of Kosova, was met with an aggressive propaganda and operational campaign by Serbia, culminating in the violent protests of May 29.

That attack was not isolated. In the two years that followed, crises incited by Belgrade culminated in the September 24, 2023, terrorist attack in Banjska, where Kosova Police Sergeant and hero Afrim Bunjaku was killed. The common denominator in these events is the hand of the Serbian state, the involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church supported by the Russian Patriarchate, and the lack of a determined response from the European Union.

At the center of both attacks stands Milan Radoičić – a figure known for his ties to organized crime and political power in Serbia. As former Vice-President of the Serb Lista, he acted as a direct extension of Vučić’s policies in Kosova, supported by the Serbian Security and Intelligence Agency and backed by a moral, logistical, and ideological infrastructure sponsored by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Despite being wanted by law enforcement in Pristina and publicly admitting to involvement in the terrorist act, Radoičić remains free in Serbia, protected by state and police structures in Belgrade.

The network of monasteries and churches in the north and in Serbian enclaves in southern Kosova has served not only as ideological cover but also as a logistical tool for Serbian paramilitary structures. In the case of Banjska, this became clear: Radoičić’s armed group took refuge in the Banjska Monastery, which was used as an operational base for the attack on the Kosova Police. This act shocked the international public, but unfortunately, it was neither condemned by religious structures in Serbia and Russia nor followed by legal or international consequences. In this context, the Serbian Orthodox Church, aided by the Russian Orthodox Church, has fueled the narrative of a “Serbian Jerusalem” in Kosova, providing theological support for Vučić’s and the Kremlin’s destabilization project in the Balkans.

In sermons and public statements spread across pro-Serb media before and after May 29, the Serbian Orthodox Church used ethnically and religiously charged language, calling for the “defense of Serbian Christianity in Kosova.” This rhetoric aligns with the religious nationalism promoted by the Moscow Patriarchate and justifies aggression, much like the rationale used for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This discourse seeks to justify a project of domination over the “Slavic-Orthodox world” in the region.

Meanwhile, the Deçani Monastery has become a hub of anti-state and anti-NATO propaganda in Kosova. There is evidence of clergy involvement in meetings with parallel security structures and Serbian political figures in the north. Its premises have been used for meetings, logistical planning, and, in some cases, sheltering individuals wanted by justice.

The attack in the north and the subsequent one in Banjska represent direct escalations of the crisis, aiming to create a situation similar to Crimea, where Serb-majority areas in Kosova would be forcibly detached. This strategy failed thanks to the rapid and professional response of the Kosova Police, the Kosova Intelligence Agency, and the firm stance of state institutions.

Although KFOR has increased its presence in the north and Kosova’s institutions are now consolidated, ideological and religious propaganda networks continue to operate. Anti-Western, anti-Albanian, and pro-Russian rhetoric dominates the sermons and public statements of many Serbian clergy in Kosova. These structures not only incite hatred but also create a favorable environment for recruiting young Serbs into violent actions and politically backed criminal networks.

Faced with this state-sponsored structure of violence, the European Union’s response has been, at best, weak, and at worst — complicit. Despite clear evidence of Radoičić’s involvement in terrorist acts, Brussels has not exerted real pressure on Belgrade to extradite him to Pristina. No sanctions have been imposed on Serbia, its political leaders, or the church structures involved in violent acts.

This European silence has further encouraged destabilizing actions in the Balkans. Vučić has been treated more as a partner who must be “kept close” than as an autocrat inciting violence against neighbors and NATO troops. Instead of strongly supporting Kosova’s sovereignty, some European officials have blamed Pristina for “provocation,” establishing a false moral equivalence between victim and aggressor.

The events of May 29 and the terrorist attack in Banjska prove that aggression against Kosova is not only political and military but also ideological, religious, and media-based. The Serbian Orthodox Church, aligned with the Kremlin, plays a dangerous role in destabilizing the Balkans and inciting interethnic hatred. It is no longer merely a spiritual institution but part of a sophisticated propaganda and operational infrastructure. Radoičić embodies this collaboration between crime, state, and church, while the lack of international pressure has allowed him and others like him to operate with impunity.

If the international community does not change its approach to the Belgrade regime and fails to impose real sanctions on those who organize, support, and legitimize violence, including Vučić, Radoičić, and clerics who promote violence, the region remains at risk of new escalations, blessed by churches that have lost all true religious meaning.

In conclusion, Kosova has demonstrated its ability to defend itself, but the future of regional stability depends on the international community’s response and the end of impunity for criminals like Radoičić and the Serbian state structures that support them. /The Balkan Report/