Unpacking Aleksandar Vučić’s rhetoric against Ankara

Vučić leveled a direct and explosive accusation, claiming that Turkey and the United States of America were actively arming Albanians in Kosova to “attack Serbia”

In the closing days of 2025, a familiar rhetorical storm gathered in Belgrade. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, speaking to a room of foreign ambassadors, did not merely critique regional policy.

He leveled a direct and explosive accusation, claiming that Turkey and the United States of America were actively arming Albanians in Kosova to “attack Serbia”.

During his speech to foreign ambassadors based in Belgrade, Vučić accused Turkey and the United States of America of arming Albanians in Kosova, portraying it as “a direct threat to Serbia and its territorial integrity” and as enabling “attacks on the civilian population and military-police structures of Serbia”.

He also accused Albania, Croatia and Kosova of creating a military alliance aimed at endangering Serbia.

Following his explosive October remarks, when he accused Turkey of “dreaming of the Ottoman Empire” after the delivery of Skydagger drones to Pristina, Vučić escalated his rhetoric again in December 2025.

Coming just two months after his October tirade against “neo-Ottomanism”, this December shift toward a hard accusation marked a departure from diplomacy into the realm of high-stakes political theater. The question, however, is not whether these accusations are true but rather, why now?

The sudden backlash from Belgrade feels less like a shift in foreign policy and more like a calculated “stress test” of the Ankara-Belgrade axis. Vučić appears to be probing how far he can push the rhetoric before it affects the millions of dollars in Turkish investment and infrastructure projects in Serbia. At this point, it is important to point out that Turkey’s exports to Serbia increased to $228.9 million in 2025, a 12.8 percent rise compared with 2024.

The duality is striking. While Vučić accuses Ankara of arming Kosova, which he frames as a violation of U.N. Resolution 1244, his own administration oversees the highest military budget in the region. In 2024, Serbia’s defense spending reached $2.2 billion, nearly five times that of neighboring Albania.

This raises a glaring contradiction. Belgrade reserves the right to “strategic autonomy” and massive rearmament while labeling Kosova’s NATO-aligned defense modernization, carried out with the support of a leading NATO member like Turkey, as an “act of war”.

Turkey’s defense cooperation with Kosova, however, is not about “arming” one side for conflict. It is about supporting legitimate self-defense and the institutional maturity of a sovereign state.

Speaking to Türkiye Today, Sarajevo-based security and defense analyst Harun Karčić said, “Turkey’s position on Kosova is clear, long-standing, and shared by most of the Euro-Atlantic world. Calling that destabilization is simply a way to deflect responsibility.”

Ankara’s “moral geometry” in the Balkans rests on transparency. Turkey’s goal is to foster self-reliance, not dependency. By supporting Kosova in developing its own defense capacities within NATO standards, Turkey is reducing regional volatility.

A secure and capable Kosova is less likely to rely on “borrowed boundaries” or emergency interventions, creating a more stable and predictable security environment for all neighbors, including Serbia.

Regarding Vučić’s accusations, Belgrade-based foreign policy researcher Vuk Vuksanović said, “Neither side appears to have an interest in allowing disagreements to harden into a long-term confrontation. Serbia remains aware of Turkey’s regional weight and geopolitical relevance, while Ankara understands that maintaining a working relationship with Belgrade is important for sustaining its broader presence in the Balkans.”

Describing the episode as a “short-term stress test”, Vuksanović added, “As a result, this episode is more likely to represent a short-term stress test in bilateral relations rather than a fundamental reorientation of Serbia’s foreign policy toward Turkey.”

Karčić also described Vučić’s remarks as “tactical”.

“For now, it looks tactical rather than strategic,” he said.

“Serbia has a long habit of talking tough while quietly continuing business as usual. Ankara’s decision not to respond publicly reflects confidence, not indifference. Turkey doesn’t need to trade accusations to make its point.”

Pointing to a deepening contradiction in Belgrade’s approach, Karčić added, “If Serbia continues to benefit from Turkish investment and engagement while portraying Turkey as a threat, that contradiction will eventually catch up with the relationship. So this may be a stress test, but it’s one initiated by Belgrade. Turkey has been consistent. The question is whether Serbia can be.”

To find the true catalyst for Vučić’s December outbursts, one must look at the streets of Novi Sad and Belgrade rather than the borders of Kosova.

The Serbian government has been under historic pressure. The fallout from the November 2024 railway station collapse in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people, has grown into a massive, student-led anti-corruption movement.

At the same time, the crisis at Russian majority-owned NIS, Serbia’s sole oil refinery, placed the government under strain after the company came under United States of America sanctions.

Although Serbia’s energy minister said on January 19 that the Russian majority owners had agreed to sell their stake to Hungarian energy giant MOL, the risk of shutdown and the broader crisis put the government in a difficult position.

Vuksanović said domestic factors are central to understanding the current escalation in tone.

“Serbia is facing sustained student protests and growing pressure linked to potential sanctions on its energy sector, which has weakened the government’s position at home. In this context, sharper rhetoric toward Turkey can be interpreted as part of a broader effort to externalize internal pressures,” Vuksanović said.

Karčić also pointed to internal politics as a key driver behind Vučić’s outburst.

“In moments like this, Serbian leaders often look for an external target to shift the conversation. Turkey is convenient: visible, influential, and firm on Kosova,” Karčić said.

Moving forward, narrowing the relationship between Belgrade and Ankara solely to domestic politics would be misleading.

“This does not mean that there are no genuine disagreements between Belgrade and Ankara,” Vuksanović said, adding, “However, over the past year, Serbian foreign policy has increasingly functioned as an extension of domestic politics, with foreign policy messaging primarily aimed at stabilizing the regime internally rather than pursuing long-term strategic adjustment.”

Perhaps the most telling aspect of this friction is Ankara’s response, or lack of one. Turkey has largely met these accusations with strategic silence. This is not the absence of an answer; it is an answer in itself.

As the country currently commanding NATO’s KFOR mission, Turkey’s role as a regional stabilizer is embedded in the international security architecture. Ankara understands that Vučić is performing for a domestic audience that is increasingly disillusioned.

By avoiding a war of words, Turkey maintains its position as the mature actor in the room, the one providing the investment Serbia needs and the security the region requires.

Is Serbia shifting away from Turkey? Highly unlikely. The economic and security ties are too deep. What is unfolding instead is a leader under domestic strain reaching for a familiar external adversary to stay afloat.

Vuksanović noted that accusations of “neo-Ottoman” ambitions and claims that Ankara is destabilizing the Balkans follow a familiar pattern in Serbian politics.

As 2026 unfolds, rhetoric from Belgrade may grow louder, particularly as the student movement prepares for its next major rally in Belgrade on January 27. The “Turkish threat”, however, remains what it has always been: a convenient narrative designed to mask a very real internal crisis.