The murder at restaurant “27” in Belgrade’s Senjak district has taken several dramatic turns within the span of two weeks. Initial allegations suggested that the head of the Belgrade Police Department, Veselin Milić, had assisted in concealing evidence. Investigators later concluded that he was not present at the crime scene when Saša Vuković – Boske, shot and killed Aleksandar Nešović, known as Baja.
Yet for many people in Serbia, the central question remains unchanged: why was the head of the country’s largest police department socializing with two prominent figures from Serbia’s criminal underworld?
According to Stevan Dojčinović, editor-in-chief of the investigative outlet KRIK, the case is not an isolated incident but rather reflects a well-established pattern of ties between state institutions and organized crime. He argues that substantial evidence indicates that segments of the Serbian state apparatus have cooperated with criminal groups for years.
In his assessment, the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which controls the country’s key institutions, has maintained pragmatic relationships with different criminal organizations, shifting alliances according to political interests and changing circumstances. Until 2021, he argues, state structures worked closely with factions linked to the Kavač Clan before later redirecting their support toward rival groups.
According to this analysis, these shifting alliances have also fueled violent conflicts within Serbia’s criminal underworld. More than one hundred people have been killed in mafia-style assassinations over the past decade, often in broad daylight and in public places. The Senjak murder is viewed as part of this broader pattern, while the intense public attention surrounding the case is attributed to rivalries between competing factions within the ruling establishment that allegedly maintain ties with different criminal groups.
In recent years, allegations concerning links between Serbia’s political elite and organized crime have been supported by court proceedings, cooperating witnesses, decrypted Sky ECC communications, and investigations conducted by independent journalists.
Journalist Branko Čečen argues that these relationships did not emerge by chance but date back to the beginning of President Aleksandar Vučić’s rule. According to him, well-known figures from the criminal underworld, including Zvonko Veselinović and Milan Radoičić, have benefited from state contracts and privileges, transforming themselves into influential political and economic actors.
One of the most significant cases concerns the criminal proceedings against Veljko Belivuk, the alleged leader of one of Serbia’s most notorious organized crime groups. According to court reporting, Belivuk claimed that his organization had carried out services for senior state officials, including President Vučić, former Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin, the president’s brother, and other government officials.
Dojčinović has also referred to WhatsApp communications recovered from Belivuk’s phone, which he says reveal a chain of command involving Gendarmerie officer Nenad Vučković, former Interior Ministry State Secretary Dijana Hrkalović, and the highest political levels.
In 2023, media also published an audio recording in which Nenad Vučković is allegedly heard chairing a meeting of a criminal group while boasting about his influence over Serbia’s police structures. Investigative journalists regarded the recording as further evidence reinforcing suspicions about connections between segments of the state and organized crime.
According to investigative journalists and analysts, these relationships extend well beyond conventional corruption. They argue that they represent a model of cooperation in which the state provides institutional protection while criminal organizations perform services that advance the political interests of those in power.
One example frequently cited concerns the mass protests that have taken place across Serbia over the past two years. Investigative journalists identified individuals with alleged criminal connections among members of the so-called “Ćaciland” group, who were involved in confrontations with protesters.
For years, reports have also linked organized crime groups with football supporter organizations that control stadium terraces and, according to critics of the government, suppress anti-Vučić chants during matches.
According to Dojčinović, financial gain remains the principal driver of this relationship. He argues that certain state officials receive a share of the proceeds generated by criminal activities, while criminal groups are expected to mobilize whenever political authorities require support or pressure on the streets.
Another emblematic case is Jovanjica, one of Europe’s largest marijuana plantations, discovered near Belgrade in 2019. Its owner, Predrag Koluvija, had cultivated the image of a successful entrepreneur while maintaining close relationships with police officials, intelligence agencies, and Serbia’s security institutions. Critics argue that the case illustrates how segments of the state may have helped shield large-scale criminal enterprises.
Despite years of investigations, court proceedings, and substantial evidence, none of Serbia’s major organized crime cases has resulted in political accountability at the highest levels.
Dojčinović argues that prosecutors use decrypted Sky ECC communications to prosecute members of criminal organizations while avoiding investigative leads that point toward senior political figures.
Čečen likewise argues that although the authorities occasionally arrest prominent criminal figures, investigations rarely proceed to their logical conclusion whenever they threaten to implicate political or institutional allies.
Meanwhile, continuing anti-government protests are increasing political pressure on President Vučić. According to Čečen, allegations concerning links between the state and organized crime are beginning to erode support even among parts of the Serbian Progressive Party’s traditional electorate, making the political environment more uncertain than at any other point during Vučić’s tenure.
Finally, Čečen argues that the Serbian president has consistently called elections only when he has been confident of the outcome. Whether future elections will meet democratic and constitutional standards remains uncertain. In his view, persistent violations of the Constitution and the rule of law have raised serious doubts about the integrity of Serbia’s electoral process, although he expresses hope that the country will not slide into a system in which elections lose their democratic purpose altogether. /Deutsche Welle/
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